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ARTICLES
Legislative Regulation of Dependency Court Attorneys:
Public Relations and Separation of Powers
William Wesley Patton*
I. INTRODUCTION
The public's "lack of trust and confidence in both attorneys and the judicial
system has created an overall discontent with the legal profession."' The public's ma-
jor criticisms include distrust of the attorney disciplinary system,2 disgust in perceiving
lawyers as "parasites, hired-guns of large corporations or grasping clients, motivated
by greed and neglectful of the public good,"3 and contempt for the nastiness of the
adversarial system. Legislatures, courts, bar examiners, and law schools have created
* Professor and Director, Whittier Law School Center for Children's Rights.
1. Lisa M. Stem, Note, Code of Professional Responsibility, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 839, 839
(1996). "Unlike the political realm, the legal profession has not always been viewed with the scorn
reserved for it today. In words that may seem strange to us now, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that
'people in democratic states do not mistrust the members of the legal profession, because it is known
that they are interested to serve the popular cause; and the people listen to them without irritation
because they do not attribute to them any sinister designs."' Senator Paul Simon, Foreword: Ethics in
Law and Politics, 28 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 221, 225 (1996) (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRA-
CY IN AMERICA 275-76 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1987) (1835)). Lawyers today personally suffer from the
public's perception of them: "If lawyers believe the public hates and distrusts them, their job satisfac-
tion obviously will be affected. Almost nine of every ten attorneys believe the image of the profession
has been suffering." Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Thirteenth Chronicle: Legal Formalism and Law's
Discontents, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 1105, 1116 (1997). "Unfortunately, the public's general cynicism about
lawyers is shared by members of the profession as well." Denise C. Redmann, Has the Golden Rule
Tarnished? Put Professionalism Back into the Profession, 43 LA. BJ. 370, 370 (1995).
2. Stern, supra note 1, at 840-41. The public believes "that lawyer discipline is an oxymoron."
Michael J. Hall & Jean Guccione, Complaining Consumers Getting Scant Satisfaction: Problems Re-
main in Bar's 'Model' System, L.A. DAILY J., July 11, 1994, at 1, 10. "[Tlhe public's distrust of
attorneys, and the legal profession in general, is heightened by the imposition of lenient sanctions for
attorney misconduct." Blaine Workie, Chemical Dependency and the Legal Profession: Should Addiction
to Drugs and Alcohol Ward off Heavy Discipline?, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 1357, 1372 (1996). For a
history of the attempts of the California Supreme Court and the California State Bar to improve the
public's perceptions of the attorney disciplinary system see William Wesley Patton, Publication,
Depublication and Review of State Bar Court Opinions: Bringing the Public into the Process, 17
WHITrIER L. REv. 409, 409-10 (1996).
3. Simon, supra note 1, at 225. "[Fifty-six percent of the public believ[e] lawyers tend to rec-
ommend more legal work than necessary because it increases their fees." Delgado, supra note 1, at
1110 (citing Gordon Black, USA Today Poll, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 1984).
4. "[T]he adversarial nature of the courtroom experience means half of those involved are des-
tined to lose their case." Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 62. The same poll found that forty-two percent favor expanding "alternatives
to lawsuits by encouraging use of mediation, arbitration, and other alternative dispute resolution pro-
grams." Id. at 64. See also Judge Sherman A. Ross, Order in the Court: A Judge's Perspective on
Professionalism for the Bench and Bar, 32 Hous. LAw. 29 (1995).
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mandatory ethics requirements in an attempt to appease the public and to remedy many
of the shortcomings of contemporary legal practice.' There is often little correspon-
dence, however, between the content of mandatory legal ethics courses and the
public's definition of deplorable attorney behavior. Courses help law students explicate
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and State Bar Rules, which focus on such
issues as conflicts of interest, definitions of client loyalty and confidentiality, and a
very few pragmatic office management or interpersonal relationship issues.6 The pub-
lic, on the other hand, defines legal ethics differently: "Apparently, while many law-
yers view ethics as the absence of disciplinary measures and adherence to the
profession's own Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the public views ethical con-
duct on a much broader scope, to include things such as fee disputes, lack of client
relations and communication problems."7 Therefore, there is some question whether
the mandatory legal ethics and continuing education courses will have any effect upon
the public's perceptions of attorney ethics.8
More problematic than the courts' and state bar organizations' mandatory educa-
tional response to the public's dissatisfaction with lawyers have been a series of recent
attempts to redefine the attorney-client relationship and to shift responsibility for assur-
ing attorney competence from state supreme courts to legislatures and administrative
agencies. Although scholars continue debating the historical genesis of supreme courts'
power to control the legal profession, most agree that courts have such inherent and
plenary authority.9 The public however continues to pressure legislators to bring more
5. Training in legal ethics usually begins in the second year of law school in formal classes on
professional responsibility, proceeds through a bar examination on legal ethics, and continues indefinite-
ly through required continuing education courses. Lore M. Graham, Aristotle's Ethics and the Virtuous
Lawyer: Part One of a Study on Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J. LEGAL PRoF. 5
(1995-96).
6. For example, California Continuing Education of the Bar courses for 1997-98 offer only one
class each in ethics and responding to client demands, but offer the following substantive and proce-
dural courses: nine in business law, eight in civil litigation, eleven in estate planning, trust, and pro-
bate, one in criminal law, two in family law, two in torts and workers' compensation, and eight in
real property law. 1997-98 Program Calendar, CONTINUING EDuc. B. CAL., June 1997, at 14, 15.
7. Hengstler, supra note 4, at 62. It is not only unsophisticated clients who want personable at-
toreys. In two separate studies the CEO's of major corporations listed issues like "[p]ersonal interest
taken in client's legal matters," "[k]eeping clients informed of the [law] firm's progress," "[a] compati-
ble personality," and "[a]ccessibility" as some of the most important factors in hiring outside counsel.
Merrilyn Astin Tarlton, On Being Human, 22 LAw PRAC. MGTrr., July-Aug. 1996, at 26.
8. "Black-letter rules of professional conduct may not be enough by themselves to assure public
confidence in the justice system." John Gibeaut, Doing the Right Thing: Lawyers May Have to Look
Beyond Conduct Rules for Ethics Answers, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 98.
9. Since the Magna Carta legislatures have "always recognized [that] the admission of attorneys
was a matter of judicial discretion." Note, Legislative or Judicial Control of Attorneys, 8 FORDHAM L.
REv. 103, 105 (1939). "IFlor more than six hundred years it has been the practice of the courts to
admit attorneys upon their own examination, and . . . at the time the Colonies separated from the
mother country the power of examination and admission of attorneys was vested in the courts."
Blewett Lee, The Constitutional Power of the Courts over Admission to the Bar, 13 HARV. L. REV.
233, 245 (1899). Traditionally, the only statutory proscriptions of courts' authority to admit attorneys
have been enacted under the police power and have been "of a negative character, forbidding the
admission of unfit or unworthy persons." Id. at 244. It has been argued that even if the history of
colonial America demonstrates that admission to the bar was not solely a judicial activity, such judicial
control "is a means so necessary to the end of adequate control that it is considered 'inherent' or
'implied' in the judicial office itself." Charles A. Degnan, Admission to the Bar and the Separation of
Powers, 7 UTAH L. REV. 82, 86 (1960). "The great weight of modem authority has interpreted this
traditional judicial power [over regulating attorneys] as being inherent in the judicial branch by the
very fact of its being judicial and as essential to the maintenance of the dignity, independence and
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consumer accountability to law practice, and public outcry in specific cases has led
legislators to promulgate expedited legislative cures.' "Office holders have become
too quick, when faced with issues of public importance, to stick their finger to the
wind to see which way the public passions are blowing."" Although judges are cer-
tainly not immune to political pressure, they are much more insulated than legisla-
tors.
12
This article will argue that the admission, supervision, and discipline of attorneys
should remain with the California Supreme Court and that the court should jealously
guard against unwarranted intrusions by the Legislature, administrative agencies, or
other constitutional bodies such as the California Judicial Council. 3 As one commen-
integrity of the courts." State v. Isner, 285 S.E.2d 641, 648 n.1 (W. Va. 1981). But see Note, The
Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN.
L. REV. 783, 802 (1976) (arguing that the legislature and courts have concurrent jurisdiction to regu-
late attorneys "unless the regulation in issue unreasonably hampered the judiciary"); Charles W. Wol-
fram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK.
Lrrnr ROCK U. 1, 4-6 (1989-90) (arguing that although courts have an "affinmative" inherent-powers
doctrine to regulate attorneys without legislative enactment, courts have exceeded their authority in also
arguing that they possess a "negative" inherent-powers doctrine which provides the court with exclusive
authority to regulate attorneys).
10. For example, one "consumer-activist group called HALT . . . is dedicated to arresting the
power of lawyers and to expanding the prerogatives of non-lawyers in dealing with legal problems."
Charles W. Wolfram, supra note 9, at 1.
11. Simon, supra note 1, at 222. A glaring example of legislators' tendency to react too swiftly
to political pressure can be observed in the area of child abuse in the creation of "Megan's laws."
Jesse K. Timmendequas was convicted on May 30, 1997, of killing seven-year-old Megan Kanka on
July 29, 1994. He had twice been convicted of child molestation, but authorities failed to notify near-
by residents of his prior crimes. Megan's death became a national symbol, and Megan's parents suc-
cessfully campaigned for the enactment of notification laws. "Before the New Jersey girl's killer was
convicted, 45 states passed a crazy quilt of 'Megan's laws' to track and keep parents informed of
dangerous predators in their midst. Megan's case also inspired the 1996 federal sex offender notifica-
tion law requiring states to 'release relevant information concerning registered child molesters .... '".
Problems in 'Megan's Laws': Courts Must Bring Order to States' Sex Predator Reporting Rules, L.A.
TIMES, June 8, 1997, at M4. In order to rush to meet the public's demand for mandatory notification
laws legislators crafted statutes which upon further deliberation might have better withstood judicial
scrutiny. "Megan's laws in nine states have been challenged, stricken or stalled in court, in part be-
cause they have been applied retroactively." Id. See also Nicholas Riccardi & Jeff Leeds, Public Get-
ting Information on 63,900 Sex Offenders, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at Al.
12. See Judge Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision
Making, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 993, 993-99 (1993) (arguing that self-respect, peer pressure, and stare
decisis constrain judges' exercise of discretion); Martha Minow, Stripped Down like a Runner or En-
riched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1201
(1992); Ted Schneyer, Foreword: Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65
FoRDHAM L. REv. 33, 41 (1996) ("The judiciary's expertise, its interest in the integrity of the legal
process, and its legitimate need for independence from the 'political' branches must be considered" in
determining who is the best regulator of lawyers.); Judge Patricia M. Wald, Some Real-Life Observa-
tions About Judging, 26 IND. L. REv. 173, 180 (1992) ("Mhe values by which judges make choices
in areas of discretion will more often than not be in sync with that section of the political spectrum
they inhabited in their former lives.").
13. Article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution defines the structure and purpose of the
Judicial Council.
The Judicial Council consists of the Chief Justice and one other judge of the Supreme
Court, 3 judges of courts of appeal, 5 judges of superior courts, and 5 judges of munic-
ipal courts, each appointed by the Chief Justice for a 2-year term; 4 members of the
State Bar appointed by its governing body for 2-year terms; and one member of each
house of the Legislature appointed as provided by the house. . . . To improve the ad-
ministration of justice the council shall survey judicial business and make recommenda-
tions to the courts, make recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature,
adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute,
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tator wrote in 1899, "it ought to be clearly understood that the responsibility of admis-
sion is in all cases upon the courts, not the Legislature, and a legislative disregard of
constitutional limitations ought not to be encouraged by an excess of judicial courte-
sy." 4 In order to demonstrate the chaos of legislative and administrative intervention
into attorney regulation, this article will focus first upon section 317(e) of the Califor-
nia Welfare & Institutions Code, which redefines the attorney-child client relationship
in dependency cases, and second upon both section 317.6 of the California Welfare &
Institutions Code and California Rule of Court 1438, which redefine minimal lawyer
competency and continuing legal education requirements for dependency court attor-
neys.
U. LEGISLATIVE REDEFINITION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
The California Legislature, in section 317(e) of the California Welfare & Institu-
tions Code, promulgated the first statute in American jurisprudence which forbids
attorneys to argue their competent client's stated preferences to the court: "Counsel for
the minor shall not advocate for the return of the minor [to her home] if, to the best of
his or her knowledge, that return conflicts with the protection and safety of the mi-
nor." 5 This statute was a very rapid political response to a specific dependency case
which was spread throughout the media in California. In that case, two-year-old Lance
Helms was alleged to have been killed by his father's girlfriend after Lance had been
returned to his father's home. 6 "At a spirited fact-finding hearing on how to prevent
such deaths, Senator Daniel Boatwright (D-Concord) said 'the law failed this child'
and criticized those connected to the case, especially . .. Lance Helms' court-appoint-
ed lawyer."' 7 Section 317(e) is in several different respects an ill conceived law. First,
it takes a zealous advocate away from the child client. Second, it transforms the child's
attorney into a fact-finder who must balance the credibility of the child's witnesses
against the state's in determining the ultimate legal issue: placement of the child.
Third, it provides no guidance for the attorney regarding which evidentiary rules or
standards of proof should be used in reaching the factual conclusion of whether return
of the child would create an unreasonable risk. Fourth, it violates the confidential attor-
ney-child client relationship if the attorney uses any evidence provided by his minor
and perform other functions prescribed by statute.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
14. Lee, supra note 9, at 255.
15. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(e) (West Supp. 1997). This section is not an isolated at-
tempt to direct children's counsel how to represent minors. The California Legislature recently enacted
a statute which requires a minor's counsel to file a report with the court concerning placement and
visitation issues. The statement "shall set forth a summary of information received by counsel, includ-
ing a list of the sources of information, the results of the counsel's investigation, the wishes of the
child when counsel deems appropriate, and such other matters as the court may direct." Act of Sep-
tember 23, 1997, Ch. 449 (A.B. 1526), Cal. Legis. Serv. 2379 (West) (to be codified at CAL. FAM.
CODE §§ 3151, 3151.5). The statute, however, protects a child's confidential communications pursuant
to section 954 of the California Evidence Code. Id.
16. After the girlfriend was convicted and sentenced to a ten-year prison term, however, new
evidence was introduced demonstrating that she could not have been present at the time of the beating.
The girlfriend was ordered released from custody and the judge allowed her to change her plea to not
guilty. See Andrew Blankstein, Lawyer to Seek Release of Woman Imprisoned in Toddler's Death, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997, at B5; Andrew Blankstein, Woman to Be Freed in Toddler's Slaying, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1997, at B1.
17. Mark Gladstone, Child Welfare System Blasted, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 1996, at BI.
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client. Fifth, it transforms the child's attorney into the strongest witness against the
child because the attorney's silence tacitly, yet resoundingly, informs the court that the
attorney possesses information which might not have been admitted at trial, but which
has led the attorney to conclude that returning the child home would create an unrea-
sonable risk."8
Everyone wishes that we could guarantee the safety of children from the physical
and psychological horror of child abuse. But courts have also recognized that the ex-
tremely moralistic and normative basis of dependency law requires a panoply of due
process protections to both assure accuracy in fact-finding and to create an aura of
fairness to the parties so that catharsis, contrition, and reunification can quickly take
place. 9 We must therefore balance the potential of statutes which may provide chil-
dren more safety with the importance of involving competent children in the process of
determining their own best interests. We must view the child's safety through the
reality of dependency court hearings: enumerable adults are in court arguing their per-
ceived notions of the child's best interest. First, the department investigates the case
and decides whether facts are sufficient to warrant filing a section 300 dependency
petition.2" The department is represented by one or more legal experts who argue the
department's case to the court; the parents have either joint or separate legal counsel,
depending upon the existence of any conflicts of interest.2' Each of those four adults
along with their attorneys investigate the facts surrounding the dependency petition and
present their cases to the court. In addition, expert witnesses will testify in many cases,
providing the court with more data upon which to make a reasoned judgment. In most
cases, therefore, the chances of critical facts not being discovered or presented to the
court are remote.
Suppose that section 317(e) had never been promulgated and that a minor's
counsel has knowledge from which she concludes that there is a possibility of further
abuse if the child is returned home, but nonetheless argues to the court the minor's
stated preference to return home. What are the chances that the attorney's argument
will be dispositive? To make that determination, we must consider the ethos of depen-
dency court judges in the 1990's. The judge must cope with two significant pressures
in deciding whether to keep the child in the parents' home. There is the internal fear
that in a close case returning the child might result in serious additional abuse to the
child. Judges do not want such injury on their conscience, even if the judge can ratio-
nalize that the decision was based upon the evidence presented and was hampered by
the inability to accurately predict the future. But there is also an ever-growing external
political pressure upon judges to be over-protective of children. Newspapers have been
18. William Wesley Patton, S.B. 1516, California's New Hybrid: Children's Counsel as Advocates
and Guardians ad Litem, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL. 16 (1997).
19. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 851 P.2d 1307 (Cal. 1993).
20. In California,"A proceeding in the juvenile court to declare a minor a dependent child of the
court is commenced by the filing with the court, by the probation officer, of a petition" alleging child
abuse or neglect in accordance with section 300 of the California Welfare & Institutions Code. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 325 (West 1984). Under California Rule of Court 1406, the social worker or
probation officer has sole discretion in filing a section 300 petition, -which alleges that a person under
the age of eighteen comes within a series of criteria putting that person "within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court which may adjudge such person to be a dependent child of the court" CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 300 (West 1984).
21. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1997).
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filled recently with the public's criticism of judges for being too oriented towards
parents' rights.22 Despite the public's perception, however, dependency judges are
likely in close cases to determine that children should be removed from their home.2"
One must wonder, with the legion of adults investigating the case and advocating their
perceived views of the child's best interests, why society cannot afford to provide a
competent abused child a zealous advocate.
But section 317(e) has a much more nefarious result than merely stripping zeal-
ous and loyal counsel from children: the silence imposed upon the minor's counsel is
outcome-determinative. Think of the highly charged political arena of dependency
court. Under section 317(e) the child's attorney informs the court that the child would
like to return home, but then must remain silent and not argue any facts in support of
the child's stated preference. What must the judge now know? What is the effect of
tie attorney's silence? It clearly informs the court that the attorney knows facts, per-
haps outside the record, which have led her to conclude that returning the child home
will create an unreasonable risk of danger. What judge is going to follow the child's
wishes and send such a child home? In effect, the child's attorney, by remaining silent,
becomes the strongest witness against his own client."4 It is difficult to construct a
more serious violation of the attorney's duty of loyalty.
The purpose of this article however is not to again question the reasonableness of
section 317(e). Rather it is to discuss whether the Legislature through its police pow-
er-in an attempt to predict and possibly reduce the chance of future child abuse-can
prohibit attorneys from performing the most jealously guarded aspects of the attorney-
client relationship: the duty of providing clients zealous and loyal advocacy. Can the
Legislature dramatically alter this historically sacred attorney-client relationship in the
22. For example, a recall effort is under way to take Judge Nancy Wieben Stock off the bench
because the public was upset with her decision to let O.J. Simpson have custody of his children. Tori
Richards, Recall Effort to Remove Judge Wieben Stock Gathering Steam, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 19, 1997,
at 3. Politicians, also upset with the Simpson case, have introduced a bill to deny spousal murderers
the right to have custody of their children. Rebecca Liss, Simpson Foes Propose Bill to Take Children,
L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 12, 1997, at 1. A series of articles attacked the Los Angeles Dependency Court
judges for returning children to what the public perceived as dangerous home environments. Uncharac-
teristically, the court fought back in the press. Martin Berg, Audit Blasts Child Welfare Department,
L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 24, 1996, at 1; Martin Berg, Judge Complains to Bar Over Report, L.A. DAULY
J.. Oct. 14. 1996, at 3; Josh Meyer & Paul Jacobs, Antonovich Calls for Juvenile Court "Houseclean-
ing," L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at B1; James Rainey, Juvenile Court Judges Assail Critical Study,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1996, at B1.
23. For instance, in 1995 in Los Angeles County only twenty-seven percent of children in disposi-
tion hearings were returned home to their parents. INTER-AGENCY COUNCIL ON CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT, DATA ANALYSIS REPORT FOR 1996: STATUS REPORT ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT IN LOS
ANGELES COUNTY 146 (1996). This demonstrates that judges are more likely to place children outside
their home, despite minors' attorneys' arguments to the contrary.
24. The attorney's silence and failure to argue his minor client's case is in some respects worse
than if the attorney testified against the child because it permits the judge to speculate about the na-
ture of the potential danger of returning the child. The attorney's silence is similar to the speculation
which the California Supreme Court rejected in People v. Rollo, 569 P.2d 771, 775-77 (Cal. 1977),
where the jury was informed that the criminal defendant had been convicted of a prior felony, but the
jury was not informed of the nature of that prior crime. "Normal human curiosity will inevitably lead
to brisk speculation on the nature of that conviction, and the range of such speculation will be limited
solely by the imaginations of individual jurors." Id. at 776. Similarly, in the dependency court the
judge might read more into the attorney's silence than the attorney considered in his own determina-
tion that return home might be dangerous to- the child.
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name of public safety, or does the California Supreme Court's plenary power preclude
such statutory intervention?
III. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S AUTHORITY OVER
ATTORNEYS
The California Supreme Court declared in Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys
Ass'n v. Woodside' that it has the plenary and inherent power to control the admis-
sion, discipline and disbarment of attorneys. Even though the court has recognized that
some areas regarding the regulation of attorneys may be shared with the Legislature
through its police power to protect consumers, the court has consistently determined
that direct legislative control of the admission or discipline of attorneys violates sepa-
ration of powers.26 For instance, in Hustedt v. Worker's Compensation Appeals
Board,' the court held that the Legislature overstepped its police power-by providing
in the California Labor Code that workers' compensation judges could suspend attor-
neys from practicing in that court. In Merco Construction Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal
Court," the court determined that the Legislature violated separation of powers by
promulgating a statute giving non-lawyers the right to appear in municipal court be-
cause it infringed upon the judiciary's right to admit attorneys to the practice of law.
Finally, in In re Lavine2' the court found that by reinstating to the practice of law
attorneys convicted of felonies, the Legislature's act was "tantamount to the vacating
of a judicial order by legislative mandate."'
The California Supreme Court in Woodside recognized some issues involving
attorneys where the Legislature has concurrent power to act without violating separa-
tion of powers.
The standard for assessing whether the Legislature has overstepped its authority
and thereby violated the separation of powers principle has been summarized as
follows. "The legislature may put reasonable restrictions upon the constitutional
functions of the courts provided they do not defeat or materially impair the exercise
of those functions."'"
25. Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142 (Cal. 1994).
26. The California case most critical of permitting the legislative police power from intruding on
the inherent power of courts to regulate the profession was an appellate court case, In re Cate, 273 P.
617 (Cal. CL App. 1928), rev'd, 279 P. 131 (Cal. 1929). That case presented a direct confrontation
between the courts and the Legislature's newly created State Bar Act. The court of appeal ruled that
despite the Act the courts, not the Legislature, had the power to determine whether disqualified attor-
neys would be readmitted. The court determined that the power to regulate attorneys was exclusive
with the courts through inherent power derived through the constitution. "[Ilt is obvious that they [the
courts] can possess no inherent powers prior to their existence, and they owe their existence to the
Constitution. Their inherent powers are therefore derived from that paper." Id. at 620. In decrying an
evisceration of courts' inherent authority through the Legislature's use of the police power, the court
stated: "If the courts exercise a constitutional function in making provision for a bar, how can the
Legislature divest the power through the exercise of an assumed police power? It is too clear for
words that the Legislature cannot, under the feeble guise of regulation, destroy a constitutional function
of either of the other departments of government." Id. at 624.
27. Hustedt v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Cal. 1981).
28. Merco Constr. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Municipal Court, 581 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1978).
29. In re Lavine, 41 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1935).
30. Id. at 163.
31. Woodside, 869 P.2d at 1151 (quoting Hustedt v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd. 636
P.2d 1139, 1146 (Cal. 1981) (quoting Brydonjack v. State Bar, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (Cal. 1929))).
1998]
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The Woodside court articulated several factors to be used in determining the appropri-
ate scope of the Legislature's regulation of attorneys. First, a statute "of general appli-
cation, which does not affect traditional areas of attorney admission, disbarment and
discipline," is more likely to pass constitutional scrutiny.32 Second, a statute which
"permit[s] an attorney to act in such a way as to seriously violate the integrity of the
attorney-client relationship, so as to 'materially impair' the functioning of the courts,
would be constitutionally suspect."33 Third, to raise a claim of unconstitutionality, it
must at least be shown "that a direct and fundamental conflict exists between the oper-
ation of the statute in question as it applies to attorneys, and attorneys' settled ethical
obligations, as embodied in this state's Rules of Professional Conduct or some well-
established common law rule."34 Thus, the California Supreme Court will jealously
guard its plenary and inherent authority to supervise attorneys; in the spirit of comity.
however, the court recognizes that the Legislature has some authority to regulate attor-
neys pursuant to the police power, as long as that regulation does not seriously affect
the court's supervisory powers.
Although frequently recognizing that there are ethical limits to zealousness,35
the court has consistently noted that zealous advocacy is a duty which lawyers have to-
ward their clients.36 In addition to zealousness, attorneys owe clients a duty of loyalty
and confidentiality, which includes not arguing against the client's stated position: "the
general duty of loyalty recognized at common law" requires that an attorney "protect
his client in every possible way, and it is a violation of that duty for him to assume a
position adverse or antagonistic to his client without the latter's free and intelligent
consent."'" It is therefore clear that the court has historically and consistently regulat-
ed attorneys in the area of zealous and loyal representation; the real question is wheth-
er the Legislature's regulation of those concepts in section 3 17(e) violates separation of
powers. After applying the criteria established by the court in Woddside,a8 the answer
appears to be yes. First, defining attorney zealousness and loyalty affects traditional
areas of attorney regulation, and section 317(e) is not a statute of general application,
but rather focuses exclusively upon a small segment of the attorney population, viz.
dependency court attorneys. Second, the prohibition on attorneys arguing the competent
child's stated preference permits attorneys "to act in such a way as to seriously violate
the integrity of the attorney-client relationship."39 Finally, section 317(e) creates an
absolute conflict with settled ethical obligations. Therefore, if protection of abused
children requires the abandonment of attorney zealousness and loyalty, it is the court,
32. Woodside, 869 P.2d at 1152.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Drociak v. State Bar, 804 P.2d 711, 714 (Cal. 1991); Ramirez v. State Bar, 619 P.2d 399,
405-06 (Cal. 1980); Codiga v. State Bar, 575 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Cal. 1978); see also In re Katz, 3
Cal. Bar Ct. 430, 438 (1995).
36. Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 370 (Cal. 1990); People v. Wade, 750 P.2d 794, 809
(Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting); People v. McKenzie, 668 P.2d 769, 778 (Cal. 1983); Davis v.
State Bar, 655 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Cal. 1983); Maxwell v. Superior Court, 639 P.2d 248, 253 n.4 (Cal.
1982).
37. Woodside, 869 P.2d at 1154-55 (quoting Anderson v. Eaton, 293 P. 788, 789-90, 211 Cal.
113, 116 (1930) (language in the reporters differs; that given is found in the official reports)); see also
Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 367 (1995).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
39. Woodside, 869 P.2d at 1152.
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not the Legislature, which should consider such changes. The court has much more
experience in considering those concepts and is much more shielded from lobbyists
and the public's understandable, yet often uneducated, reaction to the child abuse mael-
strom. The court should declare section 317(e) unconstitutional.
IV. REGULATION OF ATTORNEY COMPETENCY AND EDUCATION
In California the Judicial Council is authorized by article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution "to make recommendations to the courts to improve the admin-
istration of justice."'  Rules promulgated by the Judicial Council, however, may not
be "inconsistent with statute."'" Therefore, even though the Judicial Council has inde-
pendent authority to regulate some aspects of the practice of law, it may not contradict
the Legislature. In one of the more interesting constitutional turf battles in recent years,
the California Legislature ordered the Judicial Council in section 317.6(a) of the Cali-
fornia Welfare & Institutions Code to "adopt rules of court regarding the appointment
of competent counsel in dependency proceedings."' 2 The Judicial Council responded
in California Rule of Court 1438 by promulgating prerequisite standards of competen-
cy and continuing legal education requirements for attorneys who wish to practice in
dependency court. The Judicial Council rules have created substantial new educational
requirements as prerequisites to practicing in dependency court,43 written a new defi-
nition of competent counsel," and promulgated new mandatory continuing legal edu-
cation requirements' which omit the express waivers for retired judges and law pro-
fessors contained in the state bar requirements approved by the California Supreme
Court.' The rules have also created consumer confusion by forming a class of depen-
dency attorneys with specialized skills who are certified to practice in dependency
court, even though those attorneys do not meet the Rules Governing the State Bar of
California Program for Certifying Legal Specialists, adopted by the Board of Gover-
nors on January 1, 1996.'7 Finally, the rules have established a "patch-work
40. Wisniewski v. Clary, 120 Cal. Rptr. 176, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
41. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (The Judicial Council "shall survey judicial business and make
recommendations to the courts, make recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt
rules for court administration, practice and procedure, and perform other functions prescribed by statute.
The rules adopted shall not be inconsistent with statute.").
42. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317.6(a) (West Supp. 1997).
43. CAL. R. Cr. 1438(b)(3) ("Only those attorneys who have completed a minimum of eight
hours of training or education in the area of juvenile dependency, or who have sufficient recent expe-
rience in dependency proceedings in which the attorney has demonstrated competency, shall be appoint-
ed to represent parties.").
44. CAL. R. Cr. 1438(b)(1) (."Competent counsel' means an attorney who is a member in good
standing of the State Bar of California, who has participated in training in the law of juvenile depen-
dency, and who demonstrates adequate forensic skills, knowledge and comprehension of the statutory
scheme, the purposes and goals of dependency proceedings, the specific statutes, rules of court, and
cases relevant to such proceedings, and procedures for filing petitions for extraordinary writs.").
45. CAL. R. Cr. 1438(b)(3) ("Within every three years attorneys are expected to complete at least
8 hours of continuing education related to dependency proceedings.").
46. CAL. MIN. CONTINUING LEGAL EDU. R. AND REGULATIONS 6.1.1 & 6.1.3 (providing exemp-
tions from mandatory continuing legal education for retired judges and full-time law professors from
state and ABA approved law schools).
47. The certification for dependency court attorneys found in rule 1438 contains no due process
hearing if the attorney is denied admission to practice in juvenile court and contains no confidentiality
requirements for documents submitted during the review process. In contrast, the Board of Governors
has provided attorney applicants substantial due process if they are denied a certificate of legal special-
ization and provides that all records are confidential. RULE GOVERNING THE ST. BAR OF CAL. PROG.
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quilt"-of differing standards of attorney competence and mandatory continuing legal
education in each superior court throughout the state-which will place a substantial
burden on attorneys who practice dependency law in more than one county in Califor-
nia."
A. Separation and Coordination of Powers Among the Supreme Court,
Legislature, and Judicial Council
Section 317.6 of the California Welfare & Institutions Code and California Rule
of Court 1438 raise a number of intriguing constitutional questions. For instance, who
has the authority to determine whether attorneys possess the minimum competency to
practice law in particular substantive areas? "For decades, if not for centuries, control
over practice and procedure has been the subject of concurrent jurisdiction" between
courts and legislatures.49 It is interesting that the Legislature, in section 317.6, did not
directly promulgate standards of attorney competence, but rather ordered the California
Judicial Council to do so. At first blush, it appears that the Judicial Council has juris-
diction over such determinations of juvenile court procedures since the Legislature has
determined that the Council "shall establish rules governing practice and procedure in
the juvenile court not inconsistent with law."50 One must look to the history of the
Judicial Council, however, in order to determine the scope of its current jurisdiction.
Authority to promulgate court procedures was definitively placed in the Legisla-
ture in 1876 when the Field Code was adopted.5 It was not until 1926 that the Judi-
cial Council was given the constitutional authority to draft rules of practice and proce-
dure.52 Proponents of the Judicial Council have never stopped lobbying for transfer of
FOR CERTIFYING LEGAL SPECIALIsTs 15.0, 15.9 & 23.1.
48. CAL. R. CT. 1438(a)(2) ("[T]he superior court of each county shall adopt local rules regarding
the representation of parties in dependency proceedings.... The rules shall address the following as
needed: . . . (b) Procedures for the screening, training, and appointment of attorneys representing par-
ties; (c) Establishment of minimum standards of experience, training, and education of attorneys repre-
senting parties ...."). San Francisco dependency courts explicitly deny reciprocity to attorneys who
have been certified as competent by other counties' superior courts. SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY SUPERIOR
CT. LocAL R. FOR DEPENDENCY DEP'Ts 2.2 (West, WESTLAW through Aug. 1, 1997) ("Any attor-
ney, including those who transfer in from other counties, wishing to serve on the Dependency Panel
must submit an application to the Lawyer Referral Service of the Bar Association of San Francisco. In
order to qualify for the panel, the attorney must have handled four (4) dependency proceedings within
the last two (2) years. Of these four (4), two (2) must have been contested hearings with testimony.").
Attorneys are thus faced with a unique dilemma; even if they are qualified to practice, for instance, in
Los Angeles County, they may not be qualified to practice in other contiguous counties like Orange,
Riverside, or San Bernadino Counties. It is also possible that even though an attorney meets the state
bar requirements for one county, she will not meet the requirements for a different county, thus in-
creasing the number of state bar courses that an attorney must attend. If the Judicial Council or Legis-
lature attempts to expand such rules to other areas of practice such as landlord-tenant, family, medical
malpractice, labor law, or environmental law, the result would be a number of geographically isolated
attorneys who would be limited in the kinds of cases and in the courts in which to practice that law.
Consumers would be harmed by having the pool of attorneys narrowed in their county.
49. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making: A Prob-
lem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1958).
50. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 265 (West Supp. 1997).
51. Preble Stolz & Kathleen Gunn, The California Judicial Council: The Beginnings of an Institu-
tional History, 11 PAC. LJ. 877, 885 (1980). Jurisdiction over rule-making rested with the courts until
"[tihe Field Code was enacted by New York in 1848, and most of the states soon adopted statutes
regulating practice and procedure." Chief Justice Phil S. Gibson, For Modern Courts, 32 CAL. ST. B.J.
727, 730 (1957).
52. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 51, at 885.
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exclusive rule-making power from the Legislature to the Judicial Council. 3 Although
the Legislature has consistently asserted its rule-making authority and rejected com-
plete delegation of that power to the Judicial Council, the Legislature has continuously
added to the scope of the Council's discretion. For instance, in 1941 the Legislature
gave the Council authority to promulgate rules of appellate procedure, in 1955 it was
given power to draft rules regarding pretrial conferences, and in 1976 it was charged
with writing rules of practice and procedure for juvenile courts.54
The evolution of the Judicial Council's constitutional power has been one of
gradual expansion. But all attempts at wholesale abrogation of legislative rule-making
power have failed. Through the 1980's, the Council had "consciously remained ex-
tremely conservative in its scope of interest and its willingness to apply pressure for
implementation of its policies."' Recently, however, the Judicial Council became
much more politically active by arguing its constitutional independence and by promul-
gating a rule of court concerning electronic recording of superior court proceedings
even though the Assembly Judiciary Committee rejected an almost identical bill earlier
sponsored by the Judicial Council. 6 Taking an uncharacteristically activist position, in
November 1993 the Judicial Council adopted Rule of Court 33(e) which allowed offi-
cial electronic recording of superior court proceedings.57 The Alameda County Superi-
or Court promulgated similar regulations. The Alameda County Official Court Report-
ers Association filed a writ of mandate to preclude the Council and county from imple-
menting electronic recording." For the first time in a reported decision, the Judicial
Council argued that since both the Legislature and itself derive their power from the
state constitution, "the two institutions are coequals" in promulgating rules of court. 9
53. When the Judicial Council was formed in 1926, the amendment "almost included a provision
conferring on the Council full rule-making power. As originally submitted, the amendment would have
provided the Council with complete rule-making authority. At the last minute the Legislature deleted
this provision." Glenn S. Koppel, Populism, Politics, and Procedure: The Saga of Summary Judgment
and the Rulemaking Process in California, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 455, 467-68 (1996). In 1941 another
attempt to give the Council full rule-making power failed. Id. at 468; Stolz & Gunn, supra note 51, at
885. In 1957 "the State Bar and the Judicial Council once again recommended to the Legislature that
it amend article VI of the constitution to give the Council complete rule-making power over all prac-
tice and procedure," Koppel, supra, at 469. There has been a continuing battle during this century
over rulemaking power and that struggle has continued into the 1990's. Id. at 471-73; Hon. Phil S.
Gibson, Chief Justice Urges Effective Plan to Give Courts Rule-Making Power, 15 CAL. ST. B.J. 331
(1940); Ray McAllaster, Should the Rule-Making Power Be Given to the Courts?, 6 CAL. ST. B.J. 215
(1931).
54. Gibson, supra note 53, at 729; Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A
History of Judicial Reform and the California Courts, 1960-1990, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2049, 2086-87
(1993); Stolz & Gunn, supra note 49, at 878, 882.
55. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 55, at 901.
56. California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 46 (Cal. CL App.
1995). The Legislature in 1986 authorized a pilot project to study the possibility of using electronic
recording of superior court proceedings instead of using court reporters. "In 1992, the Judicial Council
sponsored a bill that would have allowed electronic recording" on a permanent basis. Id.
57. Id. In the 1960's the Council, for the first time, advanced a proposal which lacked support by
the State Bar Association regarding pretrial settlement conferences. "The pretrial conference experiment
was a departure from the Judicial Council's normal pattern of activity, in that it involved a decision to
implement a fairly major change in procedure without first gaining consensus among all of the inter-
ested groups in the state on the benefits to be derived from the change." Stolz & Gunn, supra note
51, at 893.
58. California Court Reporters Ass'n, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46-47.
59. Id. at 49.
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The court of appeal, however, found the Judicial Council's argument "specious, ' "
since article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution specifically provides that the
Council may only "adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not
inconsistent with statute."' The appellate court determined that the rule of court pro-
viding for electronic recording was inconsistent with a statute which specifically re-
quires court reporters and reversed the trial court's determination that the rule of court
was constitutional,62 holding that in deciding -whether a rule of court promulgated by
the Judicial Council is "inconsistent with statute" a court must "determine the
Legislature's intent behind the statutory scheme that the rule was intended to imple-
ment and measure the rule's consistency with that intent." a The court rejected the
trial court's definition of "inconsistent with statute" which the Judicial Council sup-
ported: "not... merely inharmonious or unsymmetrical, but connot[ing] impossibility
of concurrent operative effect, or contradictory in the sense that the provisions cannot
co-exist. '
The previous discussion answers the easiest constitutional dilemma when consid-
ering the effect of the Judicial Council's rules in relation to separation of powers:
legislation trumps Council rules; the Council is subservient to the Legislature. An
unexplored question, however, and the preeminent one in considering the constitution-
ality of section 317.6 and rule 1438, is whether the Judicial Council and the California
Supreme Court share concurrent jurisdiction over regulation of attorneys when it af-
fects court administration, practice and procedure, or whether the supreme court's
inherent and plenary authority trumps the Council's limited constitutional prerogative.
Article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution only circumscribes the Council's
constitutional power by making its rules subservient to statutes; it does not additionally
proscribe jurisdiction according to court precedent. Even though article VI, section 6
does not expressly define the Judicial Council as subordinate to the courts, however, it
provides some evidence that the council may not order the courts to perform functions
because it charges the Council merely to make recommendations to the courts. One
commentator stated that, "The Council's role in relation to the courts is advisory as
well. Despite its mandatory rule-making authority in some areas, the emphasis of the
Judicial Council has been on a 'tenor of judicial administration that relies heavily on
suggestion and persuasion as well as on rules.' The limitation on the power of the
Council to make orders binding on the courts is both imposed and self-assumed." Of
course, the Council's past decision to defer jurisdiction to the courts might rest merely
upon notions of comity and harmony rather than on an admission that the Council's
jurisdiction is inferior or upon the court's purported exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
attorney behavior.
Some courts have held that the Judicial Council's rules may not conflict with
constitutional provisions, as well as not conflict with legislative provisions.' While it
60. Id.
61. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
62. California Court Reporters Ass'n, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49, 56.
63. Id. at 51.
64. Id. at 49.
65. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 51, at 903 (quoting Traynor, Rising Standard of Courts and
Judges, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 677, 683 (1965)).
66. In re Jeanette H., 275 Cal. Rptr. 9, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Cantillon v. Superior Court, 309
P.2d 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
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might seem obvious that the Judicial Council is prohibited from passing unconstitution-
al rules of court, it is not so clear whether such a prohibition applies to the supreme
court's assertion of plenary and inherent power under the rubric of exclusive jurisdic-
tion and separation of powers. For instance, what if the Judicial Council were given
power to admit attorneys to practice? Would that grant of power create concurrent
jurisdiction between the Council and supreme court, would it abrogate the court's in-
herent power to regulate attorneys, or would the Council's exercise of that power still
violate separation of powers?67 And if it created concurrent jurisdiction, what would
happen if the Council admitted an attorney considered by the supreme court ineligible
or incompetent?' Perhaps the most historically accurate conclusion is that the su-
preme court's plenary and inherent power to admit, supervise, and discipline attorneys
should trump any rules of court promulgated by the Judicial Council regulating that
area of court management. "There are spheres of activity so fundamental and so neces-
sary to a court, so inherent in its very nature as a court, that to divest it of its absolute
command within these spheres is to make meaningless the very phrase judicial pow-
er." A constitutional grant of power to the Legislature of the ultimate authority over
procedure does not affect many of the courts' inherent rights because they are "beyond
procedure."7°
B. The Judicial Council's Lack of Power over Superior Courts
The Judicial Council in rule 1438 mandated the superior courts to draft and
implement guidelines for certifying that attorneys are competent to practice in depen-
dency courts and to assure continuing competence through mandatory continuing legal
education. The California Supreme Court, upon admitting attorneys to practice, makes
an independent determination that they are presumptively competent to represent cli-
ents in any court.
The admission of an attorney to the bar establishes that the State deems him com-
petent to undertake the practice of law before all our courts, in all types of actions.
67. Informal court procedures promulgated pursuant to courts' "implied power to expedite hearings,
facilitate court business and fulfill more effectively the duty imposed upon it . . . are equally enforce-
able so long as they are reasonable and do not conflict with legislative enactments or rules promul-
gated by the Judicial Council." In re Jeanette H., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 15. Section 68070 of the Califor-
nia Government Code provides that, "Every court of record may make rules for its own govern-
ment . .. not inconsistent with law or with the rules adopted and prescribed by the Judicial Council."
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 68070(a) (West 1997). That code section, however, is "merely a statutory confir-
mation of an inherent power of these courts rather than as a grant from the Legislature of this power
to them." Wisniewski v. Clary, 120 Cal. Rptr. 176, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). One must wonder
where this ontological circle leads: if section 68070 is merely a codification of courts' inherent
rulemaking authority and not a legislative grant of authority, why and how do the Judicial Council's
rules trump the courts' rules? Perhaps the answer is that only those statutes dealing with what has
traditionally been the "procedural" prerogative of the Legislature trump courts' inherent power to regu-
late its business. "A court may not by rule change or add to procedural requirements established by
statutory provision." Conae v. Conae, 241 P.2d 266, 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
68. "[C]onflicts have occasionally arisen between court rules and legislative enactments purporting
to cover the same subject-matter. This conflict has not arisen in California since the statutory and
constitutional provisions governing the exercise of the rule-making power have consistently provided
that any rules of court were to be subordinated to procedural statutes on the subject." Ralph N. Kleps,
Efforts to Govern Court Procedure by Rule Make Progress in California, 17 CAL. ST. BJ. 18, 22
(1942).
69. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 30.
70. Id. at 33.
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If that appraisal turns out not to be erroneous, we [the supreme court] are the only
court having jurisdiction to take direct action."
The Judicial Council has no authority to order the trial courts to overrule the supreme
court's determination of an attorney's presumptive competence. In addition, trial courts
exceed their jurisdiction in drafting prerequisites for practicing in dependency court if
failure to complete those educational requirements results in the inability of attorneys
to practice in that court. If the supreme court's finding that admitted attorneys are
presumptively competent were in a case holding, any contrary finding by the trial court
through a series of prerequisites would violate the doctrine of Auto Equity Sales, Inc.
v. Superior Court72 and would be a nullity. Since the supreme court's admission of
attorneys is closer to one of its administrative functions, however, a contrary finding of
presumptive competency by the trial court would be a nullity because it would be an
ultra vires act.73 Neither statutory nor historical inherent power to function as
gatekeepers to the practice of law has resided with the trial courts. Superior courts may
only make rules for their own government not inconsistent with legislative or constitu-
tional provisions.74
C. The California Supreme Court's Authority
The California Supreme Court has never decided the constitutional* boundaries
between itself and the Judicial Council regarding the admission and continuing regula-
tion of attorneys, even though it has determined that the Legislature has no power to
admit, remove, or suspend the privileges of an attorney to appear in court.75 Other
state supreme courts have had the opportunity to consider their power to admit and
continue regulating attorney's conduct and education after admission to the bar. In
every case examined below where such attorney regulation by the Legislature or other
administrative body would result in a total ban upon an attorney appearing in court, the
regulation has been found to have violated separation of powers.
In Ball v. Roberts76 the Arkansas Legislature passed a statute which provided.
that if an attorney certified that he had not taken a criminal law course in twenty-five
years and did not regularly practice criminal law he would not be appointed to repre-
sent indigent criminal defendants. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the statute
violated separation of powers because "[tihe right to decide whether an attorney who
71. Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d 65, 73 (Cal. 1968) (emphasis added).
72. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937 (Cal. 1962). In Auto Equity Sales
the California Supreme Court defined the limited jurisdiction of inferior courts. In that case the appel-
late department of the superior court admitted that a District Court of Appeal case was directly on
point, but refused to follow it because it believed that the appellate court had incorrectly decided that
opinion. The supreme court held that, "Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising
inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the doctrine of stare decisis makes no sense. The decisions of this court are binding upon and must
be followed by all the state courts of California." 369 P.2d at 939-40. Thus, under the doctrine of
Auto Equity Sales, the superior courts cannot refuse to permit attorneys certified as competent by the
California Supreme Court the ability to practice in dependency courts based upon a presumption of
incompetency or upon a series of mandated prerequisites.
73. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6001 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); Keller v. State Bar, 767
P.2d 1020, 1025 (Cal. 1989).
74. Section 68070 of the California Government Code provides trial courts with the power to
manage their affairs. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 68070(a) (West 1997).
75. Hustedt v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1981).
76. Ball v. Roberts, 722 S.W.2d 829 (Ark. 1987).
[Vol. 24:3
Dependency Court Attorneys
regularly practices before a court, can be appointed.., is a judicial question, not a
legislative one."7
In State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate78 the Wisconsin Legislature passed
a statute which in part established "a continuing legal education requirement on attor-
neys prior to their appointment as guardians ad litem."79 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court found that the statute "improperly intrudes on a regulation of the practice of law
that is exclusively within the province of the judiciary. Accordingly, we hold the stat-
ute void as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine.""° The
court further found that the statute "usurps the uniquely judicial function of determin-
ing the qualifications of those seeking to represent a minor litigant's interest."'" In
Joni B. v. State, 2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting the
court from appointing counsel for anyone other than the child in a dependency hearing
violated separation of powers because it stripped the courts of their inherent power to
regulate the courtroom and administer justice. "A court's inherent power to appoint
counsel is not derived from an individual litigant's constitutional right to counsel, 'but
rather is inherent to serve the interests of the circuit court.'
83
In Attorney General v. Waldron,"' the Maryland Supreme Court found that a
statute prohibiting a retired judge from the practice of law for compensation violated
separation of powers. The court held that after being admitted to the practice of law
"an attorney may be deprived of his license only through judicial action for proper
cause, and any attempt by the Legislature to effect the same result by enactment must
fail as an unconstitutional usurpation of a power vested exclusively in the judiciary." 5
In Archer v. Ogden" the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a statute requiring
previously admitted attorneys to maintain residency as a condition of practicing in that
state violated separation of powers. The court noted that "once admitted to the [Bar]
Association, [attorneys] shall be permitted to practice law within all courts of this
State, whether or not they continue to reside in this State.
87
In Singer Hunter Levine Seeman & Stuart v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n," the
Louisiana Supreme Court determined that a statute which proscribed the formation of a
partnership between attorneys admitted to practice in Louisiana and persons admitted
to practice in another state violated separation of powers because the "statute cannot
frustrate this court's inherent authority to regulate the practice of law by subjecting to
criminal penalties persons associated with a legal partnership which this court has
authorized. 89 Finally, in Succession of Wallace, the Louisiana Supreme Court de-
77. Id. at 830.
78. State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 454 N.W.2d 770 (Wis. 1990).
79. Id. at 771.
80. Id. at 774.
81. Id.
82. Joni B. v. State, 549 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1996).
83. Id. at 414-15 (quoting State ex rel. Chiarkas v. Skow, 465 N.W.2d 625 (Wis. 1991)).
84. Attorney General v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929 (Md. 1981).
85. Id. at 939.
86. Archer v. Ogden, 600 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1979).
87. Id. at 1226.
88. Singer Hunter Levine Seeman & Stuart v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 378 So. 2d 423 (La.
1979).
89. Id. at 427.
90. Succession of Wallace, 574 So. 2d 348 (La. 1991).
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clared as null and void a statute which provided that an executor of an estate may
discharge the attorney designated in the testator's will only for just cause because it
violated a court rule and unlawfully impinged on the court's inherent power to regulate
the practice of law.
All these cases stand for the proposition that state supreme courts' inherent and
plenary power to regulate the practice of law prohibits any other governmental body
from setting up additional prerequisites or continuing legal education requirements
which would nullify the court's certification of attorneys' competence to practice law
in any court in that state. Applying the logic of these cases and the California Supreme
Courts' Woodside separation of powers factors" to section 317.6 of the California
Welfare & Institutions Code and to California Rule of Court 1438, it appears that they
violate separation of powers because (1) they create substantial new educational re-
quirements as prerequisites to representing parties in dependency court; (2) they estab-
lish a definition of attorney competence which conflicts with that of the California Su-
preme Court; and (3) they promulgate new mandatory continuing education require-
ments for dependency counsel and they fail to apply the exemption granted by the
supreme court to retired judges and law professors of state and ABA-approved law
schools. Even if the court were to find that the new rules are somehow consistent with
the separation of powers doctrine, they should nonetheless be reconsidered because
they create a patch-work of differing standards among the superior courts throughout
the state which will make it almost impossible for any single dependency attorney to
practice in the various jurisdictions and because it will create confusion between the
status of dependency court certification programs and the state bar specialist certifica-
tion program.
V. CONCLUSION
Most juvenile law scholars would support the Judicial Council's and the superior
courts' interest in training and retaining dependency court attorneys.92 They could
accomplish this goal without violating the California Supreme Court's inherent and
plenary power over the admission, discipline, and continuing legal education of attor-
neys: instead of making the requirements of rule 1438 prerequisites to representation of
parties in dependency cases, superior courts could list advocates' expertise in juvenile
law as one criteria the court will consider in determining which counsel to appoint.93
91. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
92. For a discussion of law school training of children's advocates, see William Wesley Patton,
Law Schools' Duty to Train Children's Advocates: Blueprint for an Inexpensive Experientially Based
Juvenile Justice Course, 45 Juv. & FAM. Cr. J. 3 (1994).
93. The trend in California is for counties to privatize the representation of parties in juvenile
cases by granting exclusive contracts to large law firms. For instance, Juvenile Defenders has a thirty-
three month contract with Orange County for $3.7 million, and another with Santa Clara County that
it is estimated will be worth $740,000 by 1999, to represent parties in juvenile proceedings. Jennifer
Pittman, Santa Clara County Taps O.C. Firm to Represent Indigent Defendants, L.A. DAILY J., Sept.
26, 1996, at 3. The San Diego Public Defender's Association has filed suit in a controversial case
pitting the public defender, alternative public defender, and private dependency court panel attorneys
against one another in the fight over millions of dollars in future attorneys' fees. Marty Graham, Bud-
get of San Diego DA Increases, PD's Decreases, L.A. DAILY J., June 18, 1997, at 2. These counties,
when negotiating contracts for dependency court representation, can require the law firm to agree to
engage their attorneys in continuing legal education. Since the training would not be a prerequisite to
appearing in court, but rather merely a contract term which if not satisfied might lead to disapproval
of a new contract, it would not violate the Supreme Court's plenary and inherent power. Much of the
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Such an arrangement would provide attorneys a financial incentive to continue interdis-
ciplinary training, but would not circumscribe superior courts' ability to appoint any
California licensed attorney to represent parties in dependency court, and would not
interfere with the California Supreme Court's inherent and plenary authority to regulate
attorneys. Thus, a determination that section 317.6 and rule 1438 violate separation of
powers would not have a seriously adverse impact on the Judicial Council's ability to
promulgate guidelines for dependency counsel competency to be considered by the
superior courts' in contract negotiations with attorneys appointed to represent depen-
dency court parties.
There is no such easy accommodation, however, regarding the Legislature's usur-
pation in section 317(e) of the supreme court's inherent and plenary authority to define
the nature of the attorney-client relationship and the ambit of zealous advocacy. If
California is going to provide abused and neglected children-who are parties to the
litigation-less zealous advocates than other parties, or if the rules of professional
responsibility are to be modified to consider the unique aspects of the attorney-child
client relationship, it is the California Supreme Court with its knowledge of lawyers
and competent advocacy, not the Legislature with its substantial number of lay elected
officials, which should decide these important issues. The Legislature, which reacts
more directly and immediately to specific cases and the political heat applied by inter-
est groups and lobbyists, is an inappropriate forum for deciding the nature of the attor-
ney-child client relationship.
If the California Supreme Court holds that the Legislature, through its exercise of
the police power, may protect what it sees as children's best interests by stripping from
them traditional notions of zealous advocacy, what legislation might we expect to see
in the future? If the focus of the child dependency system is to solely protect the best
interests of children, then why not take zealous representation from all parties to the
dependency proceedings? It is doubtful that the California Supreme Court would also
uphold a statute which provides,
Attorneys representing parents in dependency court proceedings, not involving the
termination of parental rights, may not argue to the court for return of the minor to
the parents if to the best of his or her knowledge, that return conflicts with the
protection and safety of the minor. However, the attorney shall inform the court of
the parents' wishes.'
micro-management features of rule 1438, such as how often counsel should meet with the child client,
can be drafted as contractual terms, rather than as qualifications for an attorney to be certified as
"competent." There are limits however to how specific the contractual constraints may be before they
trample on the independence of dependency counsel to be zealous advocates. For instance, the court
could not base its contract on requiring counsel to waive closing argument in order to save judicial
resources. California Rule of Court 76.5 provides a compromise solution between no regulation and
prerequisites by requiring appellate courts to review an attorney s qualifications before appointing coun-
sel to represent an indigent and then to "place the attorney's name on one or more lists to receive ap-
pointments to cases for which he or she is qualified." CAL. R. Cr. 76.5. Of course, if under Rule
76.5 the justices bar counsel from representing defendants, they would similarly violate separation of
powers.
94. In 1928, in his concurring opinion in In re Cate, 273 P. 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928), rev'd,
279 P. 131 (Cal. 1929), Justice Thompson posed another perplexing hypothetical: "Suppose the Legisla-
ture should say . . .that it is the duty of lawyers to communicate to the court and jury all that has
been conveyed to them by their clients, thereby destroying the useful relation of attorney and cli-
ent .... Must they [the court] sit idly by and see the profession deprived of their usefulness, and
they themselves deprived of the services of their officers, because the Legislature in the exercise of
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A competent child in dependency proceedings needs and is entitled to a zealous advo-
cate, just like all other parties in court. The results of the hearing are as important or
more important to the child as they are to the parents, foster parents, or prospective
adoptive parents.
There is an inescapable irony in the Legislature's passage of section 317(e), as
well as in section 317.6 and the Judicial Council's response in rule 1438. On the one
hand an elaborate system of competency findings and continuing legal education re-
quirements has been established to assure that parties in dependency court are provided
knowledgeable and excellent counsel. But on the other hand, counsel for children have
had their mouths taped shut; they cannot use those advocacy skills to argue the child
client's stated preferences. Children's counsel are left with the following scenario. A
ten-year-old girl, abused by a trusted adult, develops a trusting relationship with her
court appointed attorney during several weeks of fact investigation and trial prepara-
tion. Before the child and attorney enter court for the dependency disposition hearing,
the child's attorney stoops down and tells her, "I am sorry, but I cannot argue to the
court that you should go home." What must the child be thinking as she is seemingly
betrayed by another trusted adult? So much for attorney loyalty. So much for zealous
advocacy. The child victim is re-victimized.
the 'police power' has so decreed? We think it too apparent for argument that the courts are to deter-
mine the duty of their officers and the standards of conduct by which their usefulness to the courts
and the cause of justice shall be preserved." Id. at 627-28.
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